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Abstract
Economic inequality may fuel frustration, possibly leading to anger and antisocial behavior.
We experimentally study a situation where only the rich can reduce inequality while the poor
can express their discontent by destroying the wealth of a rich counterpart with whom they had
no previous interaction. We test whether the emergence of such forms of antisocial behavior
depends only on the level of inequality, or also on the conditions under which inequality occurs.
We compare an environment in which the rich can unilaterally reduce inequality with one where
generosity makes them vulnerable to exploitation by the poor. We find that the rich are expected
to be more generous in the former scenario than in the latter, but in fact this hope is systematically
violated. We also observe that the poor engage in forms of antisocial behavior more often when
reducing inequality would be safe for the rich. These results cannot be rationalized by inequality
aversion alone, while they are in line with recent models that focus on anger as the result of the
frustration of expectations.
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
The steady increase in economic inequality is considered one of the main societal challenges
of our times. Social tensions have gained a prominent role in the public arena and are at the
center of heated political debates. The media and the rise of popular movements such as Oc-
cupy Wall Street have increasingly given voice to these tensions. While the extent of inequality
is of course a decisive factor in fueling social unrest, not all inequalities are born alike. What
is deemed fair and acceptable can greatly depend on the process that led to inequality.
We experimentally study the rise of antisocial behavior, under two different scenarios. In
the first, being generous entails no risk, while in the second reducing inequality exposes the
rich to the risk of exploitation by the poor. To study antisocial behavior, we allow the poor
to express their discontent by destroying all the money at stake and by letting them target
strangers, whose reputation is unobservable and with whom one has never interacted before.
Our goal is to investigate three main questions: (i) whether the two environments – safe
vs. risky – generate different levels of inequality in outcomes; (ii) whether being exposed to an
extremely polarized economy induces subjects to undertake actions that are both individually
and socially costly; (iii) whether this reaction depends only on the level of the experienced
inequality, or whether the situation in which the polarization emerged plays a role as well.
We report similar realized levels of inequality across our two experimental condition but
different levels of antisocial behavior. This suggests that the choice to behave antisocially is
not only driven by the realized and observed level of inequality, but also by the context in which
it emerged.
To better understand why we observe more antisocial behavior when the rich could reduce
inequality at no risk for themselves, we measured expectations about behavior in our novel
game. Our findings suggest that the mismatch between expectations and realized outcomes
is a major contributor for the decision to engage in antisocial behavior targeted at others,
whose past is unknown. If the difference between expectations and reality is wider, we should
expect much stronger reactions to inequality than what the absolute inequality level itself might
suggest.
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1 Introduction
Most people dislike disadvantageous inequality, to the point that they might be ready to burn
money in order to reduce it (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness
and Rabin, 2002; Balafoutas et al., 2013). Previous studies also suggest that inequality leads
to conflict, vendetta behavior, riots, and extreme forms of intergroup punishment (Abbink
et al., 2011; Abbink, 2012; Bolle et al., 2014; Eckel et al., 2016). Yet, not all inequalities are
born alike: whether a certain distribution of wealth is deemed fair and acceptable can greatly
depend on the process that generated it (Konow, 2000; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Alesina
and La Ferrara, 2005; Cappelen et al., 2007; Faravelli, 2007; Cappelen et al., 2013; Fehr, 2015;
Alma˚s et al., 2016; Cassar and Klein, 2016; Bortolotti et al., 2017; Cappelen et al., 2017).
Here we consider an environment that gives rise to a polarized income distribution (Esteban
and Ray, 1994; Permanyer, 2018) with only two classes, the rich and the poor. Inequality in
opportunities is imposed exogenously but inequality in outcomes is determined endogenously
by the behavior of the rich, who could achieve perfect equality through a generous act; the
poor, instead, have no means to enforce any form of redistribution.
Within this framework, we compare a scenario in which being generous entails no risk, with
one where reducing inequality exposes the rich to the risk of exploitation by the poor; we focus
on whether the poor react differently to these two different situations. To study this aspect,
we allow the poor to express their discontent by destroying all the money at stake (“antiso-
cial behavior”). Importantly, we are not interested in the poor’s reaction as a form of direct
punishment, but rather as an extreme act of protest which is undertaken before even knowing
whether the rich who will be harmed would in fact be generous or not. In this sense, we con-
sider a form of antisocial behavior that is directed towards a random person from a category of
people – the “elite” – and not toward someone who is directly responsible for the suffered harm.
Our goal is to investigate three main questions: (i) whether the two environments – safe
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vs. risky – generate different levels of inequality in outcomes; (ii) whether being exposed to an
extremely polarized economy induces subjects to undertake actions that are both individually
and socially costly; (iii) whether this reaction depends only on the level of the experienced
inequality, or whether the situation in which the polarization emerged plays a role as well.
It is hard to collect clean evidence on this phenomenon from observational data. Individual
expectations are difficult to measure and keeping inequality constant across contexts can also
prove challenging. In addition, it would also be difficult to control for strategic and monetary
motives triggering the antisocial behavior. Episodes of vandalism and violent forms of protest
may be rationalized as a way to affect political leaders’ decisions (Lohmann, 1993). To exclude
this sort of strategic motives, we analyze the insurgence of antisocial behavior in a tightly con-
trolled laboratory environment.
To this aim, we devised a game – the Inequality Game – where a Strong player must decide
whether to be “generous” or “defensive”, while her Weak counterpart must choose between
“collaborate” and “exploit”. If the Strong player is generous and the Weak one collaborates,
they split the surplus equally. However this is not an equilibrium, because the Weak player
would earn more by exploiting. By contrast, if the Strong player is defensive the Weak player
has no choice but to collaborate, which grants the Strong player most of the surplus. This is in
fact the unique Nash equilibrium of the game: inequality is therefore ingrained in the structure
of the game and arises endogenously, even though there exists a perfectly equal outcome. In a
between-subjects design, we manipulate whether being generous is Risky or Safe for the Strong
player, by switching from a simultaneous, to a sequential version of the game where the Weak
player moves first.
To study the extent of antisocial behavior in these scenarios, we introduce the possibility
to “exit” the game, destroying all the surplus potentially generated by the encounter. This
captures a situation where Weak players do not have the chance to voice their complaints to
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try to improve their prospects, and burning money by quitting the game might be the only way
to express their discontent. The timing of such decision is crucial: the destruction of resources
(exit) happens before knowing whether the Strong counterpart will be generous or not, hence
one may end up harming an innocent and well-intentioned opponent. The Inequality Game
is one shot in order to rule out reciprocity and reputational mechanisms; however, to allow
players to gain experience with the game, we let them interact repeatedly for ten periods, with
fixed roles and perfect stranger matching.
We report three main results. First, the realized level of inequality is not significantly dif-
ferent between treatments. In other words, the Strong players are not more generous when it
is safe to be so. Second, exit emerges only after some experience of the game and takes place
more often in the Safe than in the Risky treatment. Third, a closer look at individual experi-
ences indicates that the Weak players’ decision to exit in one round is strongly correlated with
their experience in previous rounds: being repeatedly matched with Strong players who never
act generously is positively associated with the use of exit. Interestingly, this effect is much
more pronounced in the Safe treatment where the Strong players could unilaterally equalize
the payoffs. This finding suggests that the choice to exit is not only driven by the realized and
observed level of inequality, but also by the context in which it emerged.
To better understand why we observe more exit in Safe, we consider the role of expectations.
In particular, a long tradition in the psychological literature suggests that disappointment of
expectations may lead to frustration and hence anger (Potegal et al., 2010, Chapter 5). We
conjecture that the Weak would expect the Strong to be more generous in the Safe than in
the Risky scenario, and hence the same inequality level can generate different frustration and
anger levels. According to this psychological paradigm, anger can in turn result in costly and
economically inefficient actions that are not necessarily motivated by strategic concerns – i.e.,
a threat to improve the current situation – or targeted toward the person responsible for the
disappointing outcome. Intuitively, that would mean that the lack of generosity by the Strong
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might ignite more exit when inequality is less expected and hence frustration is higher. This
idea has recently been incorporated into formal models of psychological game theory by Bat-
tigalli et al. (2018, 2019). We show that, within our framework, the model by Battigalli et al.
(2018) would imply that the same level of inequality can ignite different levels of discontent
and hence different reactions, depending on what the less well-off expected for their future in
the first place.
Our hypothesis is that the Weak exhibit a stronger reaction to inequality in the Safe than
in the Risky scenario because these two environments generate different expectations on the
behavior of the Strong players. The idea is that frustration can grow over time: one enters the
first round with some hope for redistribution, but then observes that the unequal outcome is
realized over and over again. This frustration cannot be unleashed against a previous partner,
whose actions are known, as exit can only affect the outcome of the period that is about to
be played, where the player faces a completely unknown counterpart. If the Weak expect their
Strong counterpart to be more generous in the Safe than in the Risky treatment, then – if faced
with the same level of inequality – they would exit more often because they experience greater
frustration and discontent. To directly assess whether the Risky and the Safe treatments in
fact induce different expectations on players’ behavior, and on the realized degree of inequality,
we elicit beliefs by means of an incentivized procedure. This “Belief Experiment” involved
a new set of participants, who never took part in the Inequality Game but had to read the
instructions and guess the actual choices made by the participants in our “Main Experiment.”
The Belief experiment provides support for the idea that the mismatch between expecta-
tions and realized outcomes could be an important determinant of the decision to harm a Strong
stranger. Results confirm that subjects expect the Strong players to be generous more often
in the Safe than in the Risky environment. Since subjects in the two experiments are drawn
from the same pool of participants, it is reasonable to assume that participants in the Main
Experiment also had higher hopes for a more equal distribution of earnings in Safe than Risky.
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Taken together, the two experiments suggest that a polarized distribution of resources may
ignite extreme reactions in the form of antisocial behavior targeted at the elite in general when
the specific person who is directly responsible for the unequal distribution of wealth cannot be
targeted. In addition, initial expectations about the likelihood of an even outcome can play an
important role in driving the reaction to inequality: discontent, anger and aggressiveness will
emerge when rosy expectations are frustrated by reality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main elements of novelty of
our study, while Section 3 introduces the Inequality Game, illustrates the design of the Main
Experiment and describes the experimental procedures. Section 4 presents the results of the
Main Experiment. Section 5 details the design and results of the Belief Experiment. Section 6
discusses our findings in light of different theoretical models and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
With respect to the existing literature, the most important element of novelty of our Main
Experiment is the timing of the exit decision. By forcing subjects to exit before the interaction
takes place, we remove any strategic motivation behind this – individually and socially costly
– choice. This sets us apart from other forms of direct and indirect punishment which have
been extensively studied in the literature.1 In contrast to the Ultimatum Game (Gu¨th et al.,
1982), where proposers may have an incentive to increase the offer to the responders if they fear
that they will reject, and to the Power-to-Take Game (Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Bosman
et al., 2005), where the take-authority might hesitate to take too much since the responder may
react by destroying part of the endowment, exiting in our setting cannot provide any motive
for the counterpart to share the resources more equally, not even off the equilibrium path.
1See for instance Gu¨th et al. (1982); Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000); Bosman and van Winden (2002); Fehr and
Fischbacher (2004); Bosman et al. (2005); Nikiforakis (2008); Ule et al. (2009); Balafoutas et al. (2014); Gu¨th
and Kocher (2014).
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As we already pointed out, the form of antisocial behavior we consider is directed towards
a category of people and not toward someone who is directly responsible for the suffered harm.
In this respect, the situation we analyze is also different from the one modeled by Bartling and
Fischbacher (2012) and Bartling et al. (2015), where the direct attribution of responsibility is
the main driver of punishment. Similarly, expectation-based models such as the one proposed
by Rabin (1993) do not predict any exit. The timing of the exit decision marks a difference also
from two recent experimental studies (Aina et al., 2018; Persson, 2018) testing the theoretical
framework by Battigalli et al. (2018). In fact, in both studies the antisocial behavior follows
the realization of the outcome.
The only study with a punishment close to ours is Lacomba et al. (2014), which investigates
post-conflict behavior where conflict is created through a Tullock contest. The study includes
one treatment in which losers of the contest can decide to burn money before knowing how
much the winner of the contest will appropriate. The primary difference between Lacomba
et al. (2014) and our study lies in the research question we answer. While Lacomba et al.
(2014) design is not suited to see how expectations affect antisocial behavior, we explicitly
manipulate the expectations of Weak players on Strong players behavior. In addition, when
they decide whether to burn money, the losers in Lacomba et al. (2014) know they will inevitably
be poorer than the winners, whereas the players in our design make their decision in a position
where an equitable outcome is possible.
3 Inequality Game and Exit: Design
In the Main Experiment, we implemented a two-by-two between-subjects design. We exoge-
nously manipulated two dimensions: the degree of strategic risk and the availability of an exit
option. In the remainder of this section, we first describe the Safe and Risky variants of the
Inequality Game. We then introduce the exit option and illustrate the difference between the
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Control and the Exit treatment; finally we provide details on the experimental procedures.
Figure 1: The Inequality Game
(a) Risky treatment (b) Safe treatment
The Inequality Game. To endogenously generate inequality, we developed a two-by-two
asymmetric zero-sum game that involves a Strong and a Weak player.2 The Strong player can
choose between Defensive and Generous and the Weak one between Exploit and Collaborate:
the payoffs (expressed in Euro) are reported in Figure 1. In the Risky treatment, both players
decide at the same time, while in the Safe treatment, the Weak player decides first. In the
latter treatment, we used the strategy method for Strong players, so that they made a decision
for both nodes.
The Inequality Game is dominance-solvable and has the same, unique Nash Equilibrium
outcome (Collaborate, Defensive) in the Safe and the Risky versions. The equilibrium payoffs
are e9 for the Strong and e1 for the Weak player. Even though the payoffs in equilibrium are
highly unequal, it is important to notice that a perfectly equitable outcome exists. The equal
split, however, can be achieved only if the Strong player chooses a strictly dominated action.
The two treatments – Risky and Safe – fundamentally differ in the way the equitable outcome
can be reached. A fair-minded Strong player can play Generous in the Risky game in the hope
to reach the equal split (Collaborate, Generous). However, a self-interested Weak player could
2The instructions were framed neutrally and the players were referred to as Red and Blue.
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anticipate that and play Defect, hence leaving the Strong player with only 10% of the total
wealth (Defect, Generous). Strong players can thus choose Defensive not only because they are
self-interested but also out of strategic concerns. This is not the case in the Safe version of the
game where the equitable outcome can be reached by the Strong player without any risk.
To allow subjects to gain experience, the Inequality Game was repeated for a total of 10
periods divided in two phases of equal length. At the end of each period, participants received
feedback about the action adopted by their counterpart, and the payoffs in the pair. Roles were
fixed over the entire duration of the experiment and there were exactly 10 Strong and 10 Weak
players in each session. We used a perfect-strangers matching protocol and players were never
matched together more than once.
Figure 2: Matching in Phase 1 and Phase 2
Strong 1
Weak 1
Strong 2
Weak 2
Strong TE1M
Weak TE1M
Strong 1
Weak 1
Strong 2
Weak 2
Matching in Phase 1
Strong 1
Weak 1
Strong 2
Weak 2
Matching in Phase 2
Feedback and matching were designed so to strip away any possibility of forming an indi-
vidual reputation, and hence, to rule out any form of direct or indirect reciprocity. Four sets of
5 players were formed at the beginning of the experiment: two sets of Strong players and two
sets of Weak players. In Phase 1, each set of Strong players was matched with a set of Weak
players, to form a 10-player “matching-group”. In the five periods of Phase 1, each Strong
player was paired once and only once with each Weak player in his/her matching-group. At the
end of Phase 1, participants were informed about the average earnings for the Strong and the
Weak players in their matching-group, but they did not receive any feedback on the outcomes
realized in the other matching-group. In Phase 2, each set of Strong players was matched with
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the set of Weak players they had not met in Phase 1 (Figure 2). This implies that, at the
beginning of Phase 2, subjects had some aggregate information on the history of play of the
other players in their own matching-group in Phase 1, but no information on the set of players
they would be matched with in the next five periods.
The exit option. In the Exit treatments, all participants – regardless of their role – were
given the chance to exit the game before making any decision for the current round. If at least
one of the two participants in the pair decided to exit, both players earned e0. Hence, the
exit option is harmful for both players and socially costly as it generates a Pareto-dominated
outcome. The choice to exit could only be taken before playing the game and, therefore, before
having any information about the action taken by the other player. When they decided whether
to exit or not, participants had no information on the history of play of their counterpart, and
they could only rely on their own previous experiences with different counterparts. Subjects
who did not exit were informed whether their counterpart chose to exit only at the end of the
period.3 Instead, participants that implemented the exit option could not see the choices made
by their counterpart, in terms of either exit or actions. At the end of Phase 1, participants were
also informed about the total number of exits by the Strong and by the Weak players in their
matching-group. In the Control treatment, the exit option was not available and participants
played the Inequality Game for 10 periods without any possibility to quit the game.
Clearly, self-interested profit maximizing players – both Strong and Weak – should never
use the exit option as it always implies some cost and can bring no material benefit. As a
consequence, according to a standard game-theoretical approach, we should not observe any
behavioral difference across the four treatments.
Procedures. 240 subjects equally divided into 12 sessions – 3 for each treatment – partici-
pated in the experiment that was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research
(CLER) in May 2017. Participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and the ex-
3Knowing that the opponent did not exit might affect the player’s second order beliefs on the opponent’s
expectations, in directions that are difficult to predict or interpret. To avoid this potential confounding, we
chose not to provide this information to the players before they take their move.
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periment was programmed with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Upon arrival, participants were
randomly seated in a cubicle. Instructions were read aloud to ensure common knowledge and
a paper copy of the instructions was distributed to participants.4 An alphanumeric code was
distributed together with the instructions and participants were asked to enter it on their com-
puter at the beginning of the experiment. The code revealed the role – Strong or Weak player
– assigned to the participant. In all sessions and before the Inequality Game, there was a team
task meant to foster a sense of “group identity”. In the team task, participants interacted only
with other participants of their same color; hence two teams of ten were formed.5
Figure 3 summarizes the eight steps of the experiment. In the first two steps, the role
was assigned and the team task was performed. Step 3 included five periods of the stage game
(Phase 1) and was followed by aggregate results at the matching-group level. In step 5, subjects
were moved to a new matching-group and in step 6 five more periods of the Inequality Game
were played (Phase 2). Aggregate results about Phase 2 were then provided.
Figure 3: Timeline of the experiment
1.
Role
assign-
ment
2.
Team
task
3.
Phase
1
4.
Aggre-
gate
results
from
Phase
1
5.
New
match-
ing
groups
6.
Phase
2
7.
Results
from
the
whole
experi-
ment
8.
Ques-
tion-
naire
At the end of the experiment, participants had to fill in a computerized questionnaire, which
included some socio-demographic questions and a personality test (Ashton and Lee, 2009). To
reduce any hedging problem, we paid only two periods. At the end of the experiments, one
4The experiment was run in English and that was announced in the recruitment message.
5The task consisted of solving math problems to reveal a picture hidden on the subjects’ screen. Participants
were asked to add up three two-digit numbers and every time a member of the team submitted a correct answer,
one more piece of the picture behind the box was revealed. If the team task was successfully completed within
150 seconds, each team member earned e2; all teams succeeded.
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period from phase 1 and another period from phase 2 were selected at random for payment.
Payments ranged from e6 to e26, with an average of e15.50, including a e4 show-up fee. A
session lasted 50 minutes on average.
4 Inequality Game and Exit: Results
This section is organized around two main parts. In the first, we present the aggregate results
and treatment effects. In the second part, we dig deeper into individual-level behavior and
focus on the use of the exit option conditional on the personal experience in the game.
4.1 Aggregate behavior and treatment effect
First, we report aggregate behavior for the two Control treatments to see if our novel game
endogenously generates inequality between Strong and Weak players and if there is any differ-
ence between the Safe and Risky treatment. Second, we focus on Exit treatments by studying
whether and how frequently the exit option is adopted and if there is a difference between the
two versions of the game. We then dig deeper into individual-level behavior in Exit treatments.
Finally, we assess the aggregate effect of the introduction of the exit option on behavior and
outcomes, by comparing results from the Exit and Control treatments.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Defensive Collaborate NE-outcome Exit Strong’s share
Treatment % % % % of tot. surplus
Control – Risky 0.86 0.81 0.69 – 0.85
Control – Safe 0.79 0.92 0.72 – 0.82
Exit – Risky 0.86 0.85 0.74 0.07 0.85
Exit – Safe 0.81 0.82 0.66 0.12 0.83
Note: frequency of exit is reported only for the Weak players as exit was observed only once among the
Strong players. For comparability across treatments, the share of surplus to the Strong player is based on
periods without exit only.
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Behavior in Control treatments. To assess the possible differences in behavior and re-
sulting inequality in our novel game, we concentrate on the Control treatments first. Table
1 shows that Weak players chose Collaborate (Nash) in 81% of the cases in the Risky and in
the 92% of the cases in the Safe treatment (p = 0.028, based on a random effect panel linear
regression).6 The majority of Weak players consistently chose Collaborate in all ten repetitions
of the stage game in the Safe treatment (70%), but not in the Risky one (47%).
Strong players chose Defensive (Nash) 77% of the times in the first round of the Risky
treatment, and this number increased to 86% if we consider all rounds. In the Safe treatment,
77% of the Strong players opted for Defensive in the first round and 79% played Defensive over
all rounds (p = 0.196, all rounds).7
Average earnings for Strong players are 85% of the total surplus in Risky and 82% in Safe
(p = 0.135), remarkably close to the earnings predicted by the Nash Equilibrium for Strong
players (90%). Two observations are in order: (i) the Inequality Game successfully managed
to generate high levels of inequality as predicted by the theory; (ii) Strong’s behavior does not
seem to depend on the presence or absence of strategic risk.
Adoption of the exit option. In line with the theoretical predictions, we hardly observe
any exit behavior by the Strong players. The exit option was implemented in only one out of
600 encounters. Instead, a non-negligible fraction of Week players used the exit option in both
treatments (Figure 4).8 In the first phase the share of exit is similar in the two treatments (6%
and 7% in Risky and Safe, respectively), yet the gap widens in the second phase when Weak
players exit more than twice as often in Safe than in Risky (17% vs 7%). Overall, the share of
Weak players choosing the exit option is almost twice as high in Safe (12%) compared to Risky
6The unit of observation is the average by session and period, N = 120. Control tr. (d), Exit tr. (d) and the
interaction between the two dummies are the only regressors. The p − val for Defensive and share of surplus
reported below, are based on the same specification.
7For the sequential game (Safe) we consider only the Collaborate contingency (irrespectively of the actual
choice of Weak – Exploit or Collaborate). In the branch where Weak chooses to Exploit, 95% of the Strong
players chose Defensive.
8Table 1 only reports the frequency of exit by the Weak players.
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Figure 4: Actions of Weak players in the Exit treatments
(7%). In both treatments, about 30% of the Weak players used the exit option at least once.9
To formally test if there is a gap in exit between the two treatments, we run a panel linear
regression where the dependent variable is the average exit per period and session (Model 1 in
Table 2).10 We find evidence that the share of exit increases over periods. Importantly, this
increase is significantly more prominent in the Safe treatment (Period x Safe in the regression),
hence leading to a positive treatment effect over time.
Result 1 Weak players’ adoption of the exit option increases with experience, and more so in
the Safe compared to the Risky treatment.
9The maximum observed number of exists for a single player over the 10 periods is 4 in Risky and 6 in Safe.
Weak players that exit more than once are 17% in Risky and 30% in Safe.
10Results presented in Table 2 are robust to wild cluster bootstrapping.
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Table 2: Behavior in the Exit treatments.
Weak player Strong player
Exit Exploit Collaborate (NE) Defensive (NE)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Safe tr. (d) -0.038 -0.042 0.080 -0.071
(0.051) (0.056) (0.072) (0.054)
Period 0.006 -0.003 -0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Period × Safe 0.017** 0.002 -0.019** 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Constant 0.033 0.104*** 0.862*** 0.847***
(0.036) (0.039) (0.051) (0.038)
N.obs. 60 60 60 60
R2 (overall) 0.332 0.035 0.176 0.101
Notes: Models 1 to 4 report results from panel linear regressions with session-
level random effects. In Model 1, the dependent variable is the average share
of exits by session and period. In Model 2, the dependent variable is the av-
erage share of Weak choosing Exploit by session and period. In Model 3, the
dependent variable is the average share of Weak choosing Collaborate (Nash) by
session and period. In Model 4, the dependent variable is the share of Strong
playing Defensive (Nash). For the sequential game (Safe) we consider only the
Collaborate contingency (irrespectively of the actual choice of Weak – Exploit
or Collaborate). Symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
Weak players’ behavior. A reason why the exit option is chosen more frequently in the Safe
than in the Risky treatment may be that, in the latter, aversion to disadvantageous inequality
may induce Weak players to choose Exploit rather than the exit option, if they expect Strong
to play Generous sufficiently often. In the Safe treatment, instead, Exploit should never be
played, so exit is the only alternative for Weak players who want to avoid a highly unequal
outcome. To test if this can explain the difference across treatments, we run a panel linear
regression where the dependent variable is the average Exploit per period and session (Model
2 in Table 2). We fail to provide support to the idea that Weak players choose to play Exploit
significantly more often in Risky than in Safe.
Another way to look at the same phenomena and rule out any “substitution effect” is to test
if Collaborate is more frequent in Safe than in Risky. Model 3 in Table 2 tests if this prediction
is verified in the data. The dependent variable is the average of Collaborate (Nash) choices per
period and session. We do not find support for the idea that Weak players play Nash more often
in Safe than Risky. If anything, the share of Weak players who play Collaborate decreases over
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time with the decline more marked for the Safe treatment, and the difference is statistically
significant (see Period x Safe). In other words, the reason why exit is more prevalent in the
Safe treatment does not lie in a form of substitution between exit and Exploit. The exit option
seems to be adopted by players who – in the Risky treatment – would have played Collaborate.
So far, we have established that Weak players use exit more often in the Safe treatment
compared to the Risky one, and that this difference is not just driven by a substitution effect.
The remainder of this section investigates the possible causes of this treatment difference in the
use of exit.
Strong players’ behavior. We now focus on the Strong players to see whether their behav-
ior is different across treatments. It may in fact be possible to explain the treatment difference
in the use of exit by the Strong players’ behavior, if Strong players were more prone to behave
altruistically (i.e., out-of-equilibrium) in the Risky rather than in the Safe treatment. If this
is true, the difference in exit could simply be the result of different levels of inequality en-
dogenously generated in the game. However, our data do not support this hypothesis: Strong
players chose Defensive 86% of the times in the Risky and 81% in the Safe treatment.11 Model
4 in Table 2 reports a panel regression where the dependent variable is the average number of
Collaborate plays per session and period. While we fail to find any treatment difference, it is
interesting to notice that, if anything, Strong players are slightly more likely to act altruistically
in Safe than Risky. This is quite in line with the idea that Strong players should be more likely
to deviate from Nash when there is no risk of being exploited by the counterpart, which could
in principle work to decrease the exit propensity of the Weak players. The exit gap between
treatments cannot be explained by differences in the behavior of Strong players.
11In the Risky treatment, Strong players can choose between Defensive (Nash) and Generous and make only
one decision in each period. In the Safe treatment instead, we use the contingent response method and the
Strong players have to decide for each possible node of the game. Since the Collaborate node is selected in the
vast majority of the instances (92%), we only report data for the Collaborate node, irrespectively of which node
was actually reached.
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Consequences of the introduction of the exit option. To understand the impact of the
exit option on Strong and Weak players’ behavior, we compare the Exit treatments with the
Control treatments where the exit option is not available. As described in the previous section,
the availability of the exit option should not affect the behavior of the Strong players.
Considering both the Risky and the Safe treatments, together, we observe that 82% of
Strong players in Control compared to 84% in Exit play Defensive. In the first period, 77% in
the Control treatment compared to 78% in the Exit treatment play Defensive. Models 3 and 6
in Table 3 provide further evidence that the introduction of an exit option does not change the
behavior of the Strong players in either the Risky or the Safe treatments. This finding suggests
that Strong players do understand that they should not react to the introduction of the exit
option, as a kind action cannot dissuade the counterpart from exiting the game – recall that
the decision to exit is taken before even seeing the decision of the Strong player.
Result 2 Strong players’ behavior is not statistically different across treatments and it is not
affected by the introduction of the exit option.
The fraction of Weak players choosing Collaborate is 87% in the Control treatments, and
84% in the Exit treatments. Table 3 also reports results for OLS estimations for Weak player
behavior, and the dependent variables are Exploit (Model 1 and 4) and Collaborate (Model 2
and 5), separately for Risky and Safe. Notice also that in the Risky treatment the introduction
of the Exit option induces the Weak players to Collaborate more often, and to Exploit less
often, as compared to the case when exit is not feasible. Such an effect is absent from the Safe
treatments, where – if anything – the introduction of the exit option induces the Weak players
to Cooperate less, as they acquire experience.
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Table 3: Comparison between the Exit and Control treatments.
Risky treatments Safe treatments
Exploit Collaborate Defensive Exploit Collaborate Defensive
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Exit tr. (d) -0.173*** 0.140** 0.020 -0.024 0.029 0.042
(0.064) (0.064) (0.048) (0.048) (0.066) (0.081)
Period -0.017*** 0.017*** 0.005 -0.002 0.002 0.010*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Exit tr. x Period 0.013 -0.019** -0.002 0.001 -0.023*** -0.003
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
N.obs. 60 60 60 60 60 60
R-squared (overall) 0.269 0.134 0.028 0.024 0.361 0.061
Notes: Models 1 to 6 report results from panel linear regressions with session-level random effects.
In Models 1 and 4, the dependent variable is the average share of Weak players choosing Exploit by
session and period. In Models 2 and 5, the dependent variable is the average share of Weak players
playing Collaborate (Nash). In Models 3 and 6, the dependent variable is the average share of Strong
players playing Defensive (Nash). For the sequential game (Safe) we consider only the Collaborate
contingency (irrespectively of the actual choice of Weak – Exploit or Collaborate). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗,
∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
4.2 Individual history and exit
One possible explanation for the difference in exit behavior across treatments could be the in-
dividual history observed by each player. Even though there is no difference across treatments
in the behavior of Strong players at the aggregate level, it is still important to check for the
impact of individual experience. To control for individual-level history, at any period t, we
focus on the subsample of players who had never been matched before with a Strong player
who deviated from the Nash-equilibrium and chose to be Generous (Figure 5). In the initial
period of the game, we include all players as none of them has yet observed any deviation form
equilibrium. In any subsequent period t, we only include Weak players who have never seen a
generous action of their matched partner from period 1 until period t−1.12 Figure 5 presents the
prevalence of the choice to exit over time for this subset of Weak players who share a common
history. Conditional on having observed the same (extreme) history, exit is much more promi-
nent in Safe than in Risky. If anything, after controlling for individual-level histories, the gap
12That is the case if the Strong players in previous interactions always chose Nash. However, it can also be
the case that a Weak player chose to exit in one of the previous t− 1 periods. In fact, in such a case the Weak
player is not given any information about the behavior of the counterpart. This feature of our design prevents
a Weak player from updating his beliefs about Strong players’ behavior in case of exit.
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between the two treatments is even more pronounced and it manifests itself already in Phase 1.13
Table 4 shows the marginal effects from panel probit regressions on the exit choices of Weak
players, with one observation per subject and period, and random effects at the individual
level. We include the number of times the Weak player was matched with a Strong player
who chose Generous in the earlier periods (Observed Generous). Recall that choosing Gen-
erous signals the Strong player’s intention to share equally. Models 1 and 2 in Table 4 show
that Weak players who have observed Generous in the previous periods are in fact significantly
less likely to exit, and this effect is more pronounced in the Safe treatment, especially in Phase 2.
At the end of Phase 1, players were informed about the average earnings for the Weak
members of their own group and the average earnings for the 5 Strong players of the matched
set. In Models 3 and 5, we include the ratio between these two averages (Payoff ratio (ph1)).
A ratio of one implies equal earnings across the two groups. A ratio smaller than 1 indicates
that Strong players were ahead and the smaller the ratio, the larger the inequality between the
two groups. The idea behind this regressor is that Weak players who see a larger ratio (i.e.,
less inequality) in the first phase might be less likely to use the exit option in the second phase.
Both Models 3 and 5 show that Weak players are less likely to exit in the Safe as the payoff
ratio of Weak players in Phase 1 increases.
13We corroborate these findings through regressions. Table A1 in Appendix A reports the marginal effects
from probit regressions on exit choices of Weak players, with random effects at the subject level. Models 1, 2,
and 3 clearly show an incremental treatment effect such that Weak players who always observed Defensive in
all previous periods until t−1 are increasingly more likely to exit in period t. On the other hand, no such effect
is visible for the remaining Weak players, as seen in Models 4, 5, and 6 (see also Figure A1 in Appendix A).
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Figure 5: Frequency of exit for Weak players who never observed Generous (out-of-equilibrium)
Notes: The horizontal axis reports the period within each phase, and the vertical axis
reports the frequency of exit. Panel on the left provides the frequencies for Phase 1, and
the panel on the right for Phase 2. The solid line is for the Safe treatment, whereas
the dashed line is for the Risky. Labels on the lines provide the number of observations
corresponding to that frequency. The number of observations decreases across periods
since Weak players who observe Generous at time t are excluded from the analysis starting
from time t+ 1.
Before the beginning of Phase 2, players also receive information on the number of times
the exit option was adopted by the members of their own and their matched set in Phase 1. In
Models 4 and 5 we study whether observing a higher number of exits by fellow Weak players
in Phase 1 induces Weak players to exit more often in Phase 2. Results suggest that this sort
of bandwagon effect is not present in our data.
Result 3 Similar individual-level experiences induce more exit in the Safe than in the Risky
treatment.
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Table 4: Individual-level history and the exit option (marginal effects)
Exit option was chosen (Yes=1 and No=0)
Only Weak players
Phase 1 only Phase 2 only
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Safe tr. (d) -0.064 0.117* 0.363*** 0.047 0.442***
(0.083) (0.069) (0.119) (0.121) (0.135)
Period 0.026** 0.021** 0.018* 0.019* 0.021**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Period × Safe 0.029 0.012 0.005 0.003 0.008
(0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Observed Generous -0.051* -0.027* -0.040***
(0.031) (0.015) (0.012)
Obs. Generous × Safe -0.071 -0.086** -0.045
(0.078) (0.034) (0.038)
Payoff ratio (ph.1) 0.187 0.263
(0.404) (0.530)
Payoff ratio (ph.1) × Safe -1.590*** -1.249**
(0.495) (0.610)
Exit by other Weak in Ph.1 -0.054 -0.042
(0.035) (0.030)
Exit by other Weak in Ph.1
× Safe
0.022 -0.029
(0.045) (0.033)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs. 240 300 300 300 300
Notes: Models 1 to 5 report the marginal effects from panel probit regressions on exit
choices of Weak players, with random effects at the subject level. The dependent variable
takes value 1 if Weak chooses exit and 0 otherwise. Model 1 includes only Phase 1, Models
2 to 5 include Phase 2 only. Controls for individual characteristics include age and the
number of mistakes made in the control questions, and a set of dummies for: male, political
orientation (indicating self-reported right-wing political views), non-German subjects, field
of study (social sciences, hard sciences, and humanities). Standard errors robust for clus-
tering at the session level (in parentheses). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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5 The Drivers of Exit: Expectations
We have documented a treatment difference in exit behavior. Antisocial behavior in the form
of exit grows over time and this is true only for the Safe treatment, where in Phase 2, exit is
more than twice as frequent than in the Risky treatment. The gap in exit between treatments
is particularly prominent when juxtaposing participants with comparable (extreme) individual-
level experiences of inequality. This suggests that there must be something more than the mere
outcomes.
Our preferred interpretation, which builds on the intuition developed by Battigalli et al.
(2018), is that the exit divide can be explained by a mismatch between expectations and re-
alized outcomes in the game where Strong players could easily opt for the equal outcome. To
see the implications of Battigalli et al. (2018)’s model of simple anger to our set-up, we need
to reconsider our framework not just as a sequence of 10, distinct one-shot games, but as a
single multi-stage game involving several one-shot interactions with different opponents. For
simplicity, let us focus on the Safe environment, and consider a two-period version of our game.
We now have two Weak players w1 and w2 who meet two Strong players s1 and s2, and switch
opponents at the end of the first interaction.
Following Battigalli et al. (2018), we define player i’s Frustration Fi(h, αi) at history h,
given i’s first order beliefs αi, as “the gap, if positive, between i’s initially expected payoff and
the currently best expected payoff he believes he can obtain” (p.9). More formally:
Fi(h, αi) =
[
E[pii;αi]− max
ai∈Ai(h)
E[pii|(h, ai);αi]
]+
where [x]+ = max{x, 0} and Ai(h) denotes the set of actions available to player i at h. By
definition, there is no frustration at the root, hence this model cannot predict exit before the
first interaction takes place.
23
Suppose, however, that the Weak player w1 planned to Collaborate in both interactions,
and expected w2 to do the same, and both Strong players to choose to be Generous at all
nodes if their current Weak opponent chooses to Collaborate, and to be Defensive otherwise.
Now, consider the case in which in the first interaction w1 Collaborates but his opponent s1
plays Defensive. At the beginning of the second interaction, w1 does not know the outcome of
the interaction between w2 and s2, but he knows he will interact with s2, and he still expects
s2 to be Generous if he Collaborates. At this stage, player w1 experiences a positive level of
frustration, since the best expected payoff he believes he can obtain (that is 3) is lower than
the initially expected one (which is 5, in our simple example).14 This can justify the choice
to Exit before the second interaction if his sensitivity to frustration, denoted by θw1 , is high
enough. Formally, this is true if Exit maximizes his expected utility:
uSAwi (h, aw1 , αw1) = E[piw1|(h, aw1);αw1 ]− θw1Fw1(h, αw1)E[pis2|(h, aw1);αw1 ]
At this stage, in our simple example, the expected utility from Exit is 0.5, while the ex-
pected utility from Collaborating is 3 − θw1 × 2 × 5; hence, the Weak player w1 will Exit if
θw1 > 0.25.
This reasoning can be easily extended to our more complicated framework with ten repeated
interactions, and to the Risky environment, and illustrates how frustration – hence anger and
antisocial behavior – should be more prominent when the Weak have more optimistic expec-
tations over the generosity of the Strong players, and after histories of play in which these
expectations are repeatedly violated, increasing the gap between the payoff expected at the
beginning and the best payoff a player can expect from that point on.
The proposed explanation hinges on the hypothesis that Weak players are more optimistic
about Strong players’ behavior in Safe than in Risky. To test this conjecture, we run a follow-up
14The best expected payoff after this history is 3 if player w1, who earned 1 in the first interaction, expects
to earn 5 in the second one and knows he will be paid for either one of the two interactions.
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experiment with a new sample of participants who did not take part in the Main Experiment.
We intentionally did not collect a measure of beliefs in the Main Experiment to avoid any
possible interaction with the main decisions in the game (Ga¨chter and Renner, 2010).
Experimental design. We invited a new set of 122 subjects and we asked them to read the
instructions of the Main Experiment. Each subject was exposed to either the Safe or the Risky
version of the Inequality Game. They all read the instructions for the relevant treatment with
an exit option. After reading the instructions, participants were asked to make two guesses:
the number of Strong players who selected Defensive in the first round, and the number of
Weak players who selected Collaborate in the first round out of 10 players who did not exit.
Both estimates had to be integer numbers between 0 and 10. The belief elicitation task was in-
centivized according to a quadratic scoring rule, based on the comparison between the answers
given and data from previous sessions of the Main Experiment (see Instructions in Appendix
C).15
Participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) from the same pool as the one of
the Main Experiment. We ran 2 sessions for each between-subjects treatment at CLER in April
2018. After reading the instructions, participants answered the same set of 10 control questions
used in the Main Experiment. To ensure that participants carefully read and understood the
instructions, we paid them e0.20 for each control question correctly answered at the first try.
Only one of the two guesses selected at random at the end of the experiment was relevant for
payments. Earnings ranged from e5.50 to e19, with an average of e15.50, including a e4
show-up fee. A session lasted 45 minutes on average.
Results for the Belief Experiment. Figure 6 reports the distribution of expectations di-
vided by player type and treatment. Results show that, between the Risky and Safe treatments,
15In particular, we had a random draw of 10 Strong and 10 Weak players that was performed at the individual
level to avoid informational spillovers across sessions.
25
subjects have different prior beliefs for both Strong and Weak player actions in the first period.
Panel (a) of Figure 6 shows the distribution of guesses for the number of Strong players who
chose Defensive for the two treatments, and Panel (b) shows the distribution of guesses for the
number of Weak players who chose Collaborate for the two treatments.16 Mean guess for the
number of Strong players who select Defensive in the first period is 8.2 for the Risky treatment,
whereas it decreases to 7.5 for the Safe treatment (p = 0.045, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). In
other words, ex ante, subjects expect Strong players to choose Generous and hence be more
inclined to reduce inequality more often in the Safe compared to the Risky treatments. Mean
guess for the number of Weak players who select Collaborate in the first period is 6.8 for the
Risky treatment and it is 7.4 for the Safe treatment (p = 0.011, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Par-
ticipants in the Belief Experiment can clearly recognize the fact that in the Risky game Weak
players can try to exploit Strong players with the hope of securing a higher payoff for themselves.
Figure 6: Expectations about Strong and Weak player actions
(a) Strong players expected to choose Defensive (b) Weak players expected to choose Collaborate
Altogether, these results suggest that subjects perceive an equitable outcome as much more
likely in the Safe than in the Risky treatment, as the Strong are expected to be more generous
when they can unilaterally choose the equal split without any fear of being exploited.
16For the Safe treatment, subjects make their guess on Strong player actions conditional on the Weak player
selecting Collaborate.
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Result 4 Subjects expect the Strong players to deviate more from the Nash equilibrium and
play more generously in the Safe than in the Risky treatment.
6 Discussion
Results from the Belief Experiment (Section 5) indicate that subjects recognize the strategic
uncertainty faced by the Strong players in the Risky treatment, and expect them to be more
generous in the Safe environment. The model by Battigalli et al. (2018) would then predict that
the same negative experiences with the Strong players would induce more frustration – hence
more exit – among the Weak in the Safe than in the Risky treatment. Results from the Main
Experiment confirm this prediction, and indicate that the difference between the Safe and the
Risky environments emerges specifically among those players who never observed a Generous
move by their past Strong counterparts. Here we show that our evidence cannot be rational-
ized simply by fairness (Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or responsibility (Bartling and
Fischbacher, 2012) models.
While models based on frustration and anger can provide a rationale for higher levels of
exit in Safe than in Risky, alternative explanations based on fairness or responsibility cannot
fully account for our results (proof in Appendix B). Unlike a standard game-theoretical ap-
proach, inequality aversion a` la Fehr and Schmidt (1999) can explain the choice of Weak to
exit. Indeed, sufficiently inequality averse Weak players may choose to exit both in the Safe
and in the Risky version of the game, if they have pessimistic expectations about the behavior
of the Strong player – i.e., they expect their counterpart to play Defensive. However, Fehr and
Schmidt (1999)’s model does not predict the behavioral differences in the use of exit we observe
across treatments. Indeed, the only way to rationalize the treatment difference in the Main
Experiment is that the Weak players should expect Strong players to be nicer – i.e., choosing
Generous more often – in Risky than Safe. If that was the case, higher levels of exit in the
Safe treatment could be explained by inequality aversion. Instead, results from the Belief Ex-
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periment suggests just the opposite. By contrast, in (Rabin, 1993)’s model of intention-based
reciprocity Exit cannot be part of a fairness-equilibrium, in either version of the game. If the
Weak player believes that the Strong opponent believes that he is choosing to Exit (second
order belief), then any action by the Strong player is payoff-irrelevant and cannot be perceived
by the Weak player either as kind or as unkind; as a consequence the Weak player does not
have any motive to incur a material cost in order to increase or to reduce the Strong player’s
payoff.
An alternative explanation could rely on the idea that Strong players have a different de-
gree of responsibility in the two treatments. Strong players choosing Defensive (Nash) in the
Safe treatment can clearly be held accountable for the unequal outcome. Intentions of Strong
players are instead not entirely clear in the Risky treatment. Bartling and Fischbacher (2012)
suggest that responsibility attribution plays an important role in the decision to punish. While
the general idea of responsibility attribution as a trigger of punishment could appeal to our
set-up, formal models in this line of research always assume that blame is the result of some
harm (no harm, no blame). However, in the Exit treatments, one cannot punish a Strong
player that is for sure to be blamed as the exit decision is taken before knowing the action –
and hence the responsibility level – of the counterpart. We cannot exclude that the attribution
of responsibility and the transparency of intentions play a role in our set-up; however, we are
not aware of formal models that could fully characterize our results.
Finally, one may argue that in our Main Experiment, participants do not know what their
current opponent has done in the past, but may form beliefs based on their previous experiences.
So exit could be seen as a form of targeted punishment, based on statistical discrimination.
While we cannot exclude this argument, previous experience alone cannot account for the
treatment difference. In fact, we observe that exit is more frequent in Safe than Risky precisely
among subjects who have never observed a deviation from NE play by their previous Strong
opponents, and hence should have formed very similar beliefs about the behavior of the Strong
28
players in general.
7 Conclusion
The steady increase in economic inequality is considered one of the main societal challenges of
our times. Social tensions have gained a prominent role in the public arena and are at the cen-
ter of heated political debates. The media and the rise of popular movements such as Occupy
Wall Street have increasingly given voice to these tensions. While the extent of inequality is
of course a decisive factor in fueling social unrest, not all inequalities are born alike. What is
deemed fair and acceptable can greatly depend on the process that led to inequality.
We experimentally study the rise of antisocial behavior, under two different scenarios. In
the first scenario (Risky treatment), a reduction in inequality is difficult to achieve and the poor
have low expectations about a more equal society. In the second scenario (Safe), the rich can
unilaterally reduce inequality and that induces more optimistic expectations among the poor.
In both cases, the poor can signal their disappointment for the unfairness of the situation by
destroying all the surplus (exit option in the experimental set-up). Not only this behavior is
costly for the punisher; it is also highly inefficient. Besides, it can only target strangers, whose
reputation is unobservable and with whom one has never interacted before.
Our findings suggest that the mismatch between expectations and realized outcomes is a
major contributor for the decision to engage in antisocial behavior targeted at others, whose
past is unknown. In other words, if the difference between expectations and reality is wider,
we should expect much stronger reactions to inequality than what the absolute inequality level
itself might suggest. This result relates our work to the recent literature on the rise of anti-elite
populist movements, which suggests explanations based on the frustration triggered among
the relatively “weaker” part of the population by economic insecurity shocks (see Guiso et al.
2017, and references therein). Clearly, our study only represents a first step toward a better
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understanding of these intricate dynamics. Further experiments could prove useful in isolating
specific aspects of populist movements, such as the role of propaganda on expectations and
disappointment thereof. Another interesting aspect that could be studied by extending our ex-
perimental setting is the role of middle class in promoting a healthier functioning of the society,
as long theorized in the political science literature. Controlled laboratory evidence on the role
of income bipolarization on antisocial behavior could be important in light of the increase in
absolute bipolarization observed in the last decades (Roope et al., 2018).
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A Tables and Figures
Table A1: Individual histories and exit behavior
Exit option (Only Weak players, Yes=1 and No=0)
Never observed Generous Observed Generous at least once
Phase 1 only Phase 2 only All phases Phase 1 only Phase 2 only All phases
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Period 0.022*** 0.005 0.016** 0.044 0.045*** 0.041**
(0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.042) (0.016) (0.016)
Safe -0.099 -0.093 -0.086 -0.121 0.187 0.098
(0.077) (0.100) (0.070) (0.240) (0.141) (0.081)
Period × Safe 0.038* 0.060*** 0.036** 0.015 -0.035 -0.026
(0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.044) (0.026) (0.026)
Phase 2 (d)=1 0.017 0.060***
(0.026) (0.018)
Phase 2 × Safe=1 0.104** 0.053
(0.043) (0.089)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.obs. 213 93 306 64 177 248
Notes: Models 1 to 6 report the marginal effects from probit regressions on exit choices of Weak players, with
random effects at the subject level. The dependent variable takes value 1 if Weak chooses Exit and 0 otherwise.
Models 1 and 4 include Phase 1 only, Models 2 and 5 include Phase 2 only, Models 3 and 6 include both phases.
In all models except Model 4, controls for individual characteristics include age and the number of mistakes
made in the control questions, and a set of dummies for: male, political orientation (indicating self-reported
right-wing political views), non-German subjects, field of study (social sciences, hard sciences, and humanities).
In Model 4, controls for individual characteristics include age and the number of mistakes made in the control
questions, and a set of dummies for: political orientation (indicating self-reported right-wing political views),
non-German subjects, field of study (social sciences, hard sciences, and humanities). The difference in Model 4
is because only male subjects exited in Phase 1. Standard errors robust for clustering at the session level (in
parentheses). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Figure A1: Frequency of exit for Weak players who saw at least one Generous choice
Notes: The horizontal axis reports the period within each phase, and the vertical axis
reports the frequency of exit. Panel on the left reports the frequencies for Phase 1, and
the panel on the right for Phase 2. The solid line is for the Safe treatment, whereas
the dashed line is for the Risky. Labels on the lines provide the number of observations
corresponding to that frequency. The number of observations increases across periods
since the number of Weak players with a constant history of having observed Defensive
(NE) from period 1 throughout period t− 1 decreases whenever they are matched with a
Strong player who plays Generous.
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B Theoretical predictions
Standard game-theoretical predictions trivially suggest a unique Nash equilibrium in which
the Weak player chooses Collaborate and the Strong player chooses Defensive, irrespective of
treatments Safe or Risky. The exit option is never used.
Under the assumption of inequality aversion, we consider a utility function of the Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) type, where utility for player i is given by
Ui(x) =
 xi − β(xi − xj) if xi ≥ xjxi − α(xj − xi) if xi < xj
where x = xi, xj denotes a vector of monetary payoffs for players i and j and α and β represents
the sensitivity toward disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. We assume that α ≥ β
and 0 ≤ β < 1.
We denote with pcollaborate be the expected probability attached to the event that Weak
plays Collaborate and pdefensive the expected probability that Strong plays Defensive. We de-
rive equilibrium predictions based on α, β, pcollaborate, pdefensive.
One threshold, γ, is relevant for deriving the theoretical predictions for the Strong players:
γ1 =
9 + 8α− 10β
5 + 8α− 2β (1)
Three thresholds, θ, are relevant for deriving the theoretical predictions for the Weak players:
θ1 =
4− 8β
5 + 2α− 8β (2)
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θ2 =
9− 8β
9 + 10α− 8β (3)
θ3 =
5
4 + 8α
(4)
Predictions for the Strong players under inequality aversion
Let us first consider the treatments without the exit option (Control treatments). It is imme-
diate to see that Strong players with β < 1/2 always play Defensive in both treatments. Figure
B1 summarizes the predictions for inequality-averse Strong players (α ≥ β > 1/2) for both
versions of the game. In the Safe treatment, an inequality-averse Strong player (α ≥ β > 1/2)
always plays Generous. In this case, the choice of the Strong players only depends on their
inequality aversion and not on the beliefs about the Weak players. In the Risky treatment
instead, the share of Strong players choosing Generous depends on both inequality aversion
and beliefs about the Weak player behavior. In particular, a Strong player chooses Generous if
α ≥ β > 1/2 & pcollaborate > γ1. One can see from Figure B1 that inequality averse players that
would play Generous in Safe may play Defensive in Risky because they expect a large enough
fraction of the Weak players to play Exploit.
Figure B1: Predictions for inequality-averse Strong players (α ≥ β > 1/2)
pcollaborate
θ30 1
Safe
generous generous
Risky
DEFENSIVE generous
Considering the treatments with the exit option, the predictions for the Strong players are
the same as for the Control treatments without the exit option. In Safe, Strong players will
never choose to exit, since – for any value of β, with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 – the utility of Exit is 0,
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while they can get a utility strictly higher than 0 by choosing Defensive.17 The same reasoning
applies for the Risky treatment.
Predictions for the Weak players under inequality aversion
Figure B2 summarizes the predictions for inequality-averse Weak players in the Control treat-
ments. In the Safe treatment, there is no value of α and β such that Weak plays Exploit. In
the Risky treatment instead, a Weak player will play Exploit if β < 1/2 & pdefensive < θ1.
Figure B2: Predictions for Weak players who are not strongly averse to favorable inequality
(β < 1/2) in Control treatments
pdefensive
θ10 1
Safe
collaborate collaborate
Risky
EXPLOIT collaborate
Moving to the treatments where the exit option was available, Weak players’ behavior
depends on their sensitivity to inequality and their expectations about pdefensive. In particular,
we distinguish two cases based on the parameters of the utility function.
Case 1. For α <
9
22
∨ β >
22α− 9
64α− 8, the predictions are shown in Figure B3. In the Safe
treatments, Weak players play Collaborate unless they expect Strong players to play Defensive
with pdefensive > θ3, in which case they prefer to Exit. In the Risky treatments, Weak players
Exit if they expect Strong players to play Defensive with pdefensive > θ3, as in Safe. However,
players with pdefensive ≤ θ3 might play either Collaborate or Exploit. If a Weak player expects
Defensive with a low enough probability, she would play Exploit. The intuition is as follows:
the Weak player has a fairly good chance to be matched with a Strong player that will choose
17Conditional on Weak player choosing Collaborate. If the Weak player chooses Exploit, and β = 1 , the
utility of Defensive would be exactly 0.
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Generous and can hence exploit him by playing Exploit, since it would yield 9 for the Weak
player.
Figure B3: Predictions for the Weak players in Exit treatments (case 1)
pdefensive
θ1 θ20 1
Safe
collaborate EXIT
Risky
EXPLOIT collaborate EXIT
Case 2. For α >
9
22
and β <
22α− 9
64α− 8, the predictions are shown in Figure B4. The predic-
tions for the Safe treatment are the same as in Case 1: the Weak players will play Collaborate
if pdefensive ≤ θ3 and Exit otherwise. For the Risky treatment, Weak players choose Exploit
if pdefensive ≤ θ2, and Exit otherwise. One might notice that for large enough α and small
enough β, some players that were willing to Exit in Safe are now willing to play Exploit. They
will never play Collaborate as they are very sensitive to disadvantageous inequality and hence
prefer to either Exit or try to exploit the Strong players.
Figure B4: Predictions for the Weak players in Exit treatments (case 2)
pdefensive
θ3θ20 1
Safe
collaborate EXIT
Risky
EXPLOIT EXIT
To sum up:
(i) The exit option does not affect the behavior of the Strong player;
(ii) The fraction of Strong players playing Generous in the Risky treatment is smaller than
or equal to that in the Safe treatment;
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(iii) Holding expectations and preferences constant across treatments, the fraction of Weak
players playing Collaborate in the Risky treatment is smaller than in the Safe treatment.
The fraction of Weak players playing Exploit or Exit should be larger in in the Risky
treatment compared to the Safe treatment;
(iv) Prediction (iii) is reinforced if Weak players expect Strong players to play Defensive more
frequently in the Risky treatment than in the Safe treatment.
41
C Instructions
Instructions18
Welcome to this study on economic decision-making. These instructions are a detailed de-
scription of the procedures we will follow. You earned e4.00 to show up on time. You can earn
additional money during the study depending on the choices you and the other participants
will make.
During the study you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants. We also
ask you to switch off your mobile phone now. If you have a question at any time, please raise
your hand and remain seated: someone will come to your desk to answer it.
As we proceed with the instructions, you will be asked to answer ten questions designed to
verify your understanding of the instructions.
The study is divided into two parts. Your final earnings depend on the results of Part 1,
and the results of Part 2. You will be paid privately and in cash at the end of the study.
Your color and your team
Together with these instructions, you received a code. Codes have been randomly dis-
tributed, and determine your color, which will be either red, or blue.
Your color defines which team you belong to: the RED or the BLUE team. Each team
contains ten participants.
Your color and your team will remain the same throughout the whole study.
18Instructions for Safe Exit treatment. The instructions for the other treatments are available upon request
from the authors.
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• In Part 1, you will interact exclusively with participants of your own team: if you
are red, you will only interact with other red participants, if you are blue you will only
interact with other blue participants.
• In Part 2, you will interact exclusively with participants of the other team: if you
are red, you will interact only with other blue participants, if you are blue you will only
interact with other red participants.
We will now read instructions for Part1. Instructions for Part 2 will be distributed at the end
of Part 1.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1
At the beginning of this Part, you will be asked to enter your code and you will learn your
color and your team.
Once teams are formed, you will perform a team task. The task is to solve some math
problems to reveal what is behind the big box you will see on your screen. You will be asked to
add up three two-digit numbers. Every time a member of your team submits a correct answer,
one more piece of what is behind the box will be revealed.
If you and your team members can uncover what is behind the box in less than 150 sec-
onds, you will win 2 Euros each. If you fail as a team, none of your team members will earn
anything.
Before we start, we would like you to answer a few questions, to verify the full understanding
of instructions.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2
Your set
In this Part, you will always interact only with participants of the other team. Each team
is divided into two sets of 5 participants each, as illustrated in the following figure.
All participants in one set have the same color:
• if you are blue, all members in your set are blue;
• if you are red, all members in your set are red.
Your color and your set will remain the same, until the end of the study.
The Part is divided into two Phases. At the beginning of each Phase, your set will be
matched with another set of the opposite color. If you are in a blue set, you will be matched
with a red set, and vice versa:
• set Red A will play with set Blue 1 in Phase 1, and with set Blue 2 in Phase 2;
• set Red B will play with set Blue 2 in Phase 1, then with set Blue 1 in Phase 2.
In other words, in each phase, your set will be matched with a different set.
Each Phase includes 5 rounds. Hence, Part 2 lasts 10 rounds in total.
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Matching
In each round, you will be paired with a participant of the opposite color. We will call this
person your counterpart.
• If you are blue, you will be paired with a red participant of your matched set.
• If you are red, you will be paired with a blue participant of your matched set.
You will be paired with each and every participant in your matched set once and only once.
You can never be paired with the same participant twice, throughout the whole
study. The figures below illustrate an example of the pairing structure for the five rounds of
each Phase.
In other words, in Part 2 you will be paired with each and every participant of the other
team once and only once.
To see how your payoffs are determined in each round, please follow the next instructions.
The “Main Game”
In each round, you and your counterpart will play the “Main Game.” Your payoff in each
round depends on your choices and the choices of your counterpart.
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If you are red, you must choose between UP and DOWN. If you are blue, you must
choose between LEFT and RIGHT.
These choices determine your payoff and the payoff of your counterpart, as displayed in
the following table:
In the table, the numbers in the bottom-left corner of each cell represent the payoff of the
red person, and the numbers in the top-right corner represent the payoff of the blue person.
All payoffs are expressed in e.
This payoff table is the same for all participants.
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Blue Player
Left Right
R
e
d
P
la
y
e
r
Up (10,0) (9,1)
Down (1,9) (5,5)
To read the payoff corresponding to a specific pair of choices, you should
• find the row in the table that corresponds to the choice of the red person;
• move to the right to find the cell where this row crosses the column corresponding to the
choice of the blue person.
Blue moves first, and cannot condition his choice on the choice made by the red coun-
terpart. Red moves after blue, and can condition his choice on the choice made by his blue
counterpart.
Consider the case in which blue chooses LEFT.
Red can choose between UP and DOWN.
• red chooses UP
– red earns e10;
– blue earns e0.
• If red chooses DOWN
– red earns e1;
– blue earns e9.
Consider now the case in which blue chooses RIGHT.
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Red can choose between UP and DOWN.
• If red chooses UP
– red earns e9;
– blue earns e1.
• red chooses DOWN
– red earns e5;
– blue earns e5.
In practice, blue will have to answer one question:
• Which option do you choose: LEFT or RIGHT?
Red, instead, will have to answer two questions:
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1. Which option do you choose if your blue counterpart selects RIGHT: UP or DOWN?
2. Which option do you choose if your blue counterpart selects LEFT: UP or DOWN?
Only one of the two choices made by red will be implemented. If blue selects RIGHT, the
payoffs will be determined by reds answer to the first question. If blue selects LEFT, the
payoffs will be determined by reds answer to the second question. Red will be informed about
the relevant decision only after making both choices. It is therefore important for red to pay
attention to both choices, as he does not know in advance which one will be relevant.
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The “Exit” option
In each round, you will need to take another decision, before making your choice in the
“Main Game.” You will decide whether you want to EXIT this game, or STAY.
If you select EXIT, the Main Game will not be played. Regardless of the choices made
by your counterpart, both of you will earn 0 in this round: If you choose EXIT, you do not
have to make any choice in the Main Game
If you select STAY, the payoffs in this round will depend on the decision made by your
counterpart.
• If your counterpart selects EXIT, the game will not be played. Regardless of the choices
you made, both of you will earn 0 in this round.
• If your counterpart selects STAY, the payoffs will be determined by the choices you and
your counterpart made in the Main Game.
You will be informed about the choice – to EXIT or STAY – of your counterpart only after
taking your decision in the Main Game. If your counterpart chooses EXIT, your decision will
not be relevant. Remember that you will make this choice for each round separately.
In each round, both participants in the pair will have the chance to decide whether they would
like to EXIT or STAY, before playing the Main Game, and hence before knowing the choice
made by their counterpart.
Feedback information
After each round, you will receive information on whether your counterpart selected
EXIT or STAY. In case both you and your counterpart chose STAY, you will be informed on
the choice made by your counterpart in the Main Game. If you or your counterpart (or both)
chose EXIT, you will not receive any information about the chosen option. You will also see
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your payoff and the payoff of your counterpart.
After each Phase, that is after round 5 and after round 10, you will also receive information
on
• the average payoff of the members of your set over all rounds of the Phase;
• the average payoff of the members of your matched set over all rounds of the Phase;
• how frequently the participants in your set selected EXIT in all rounds of the Phase;
• how frequently the participants in your matched set selected EXIT in all rounds of the
Phase.
Remember that in Phase 2 you can never be paired with any member of the set you were
matched with in Phase 1.
Your earnings in Part 2
At the end of Part 2, one round from each Phase will be selected, and your payoff in those
two rounds will be paid to you.
Hence, your earnings in Part 2 depend on your choices and the choices of your counterpart
in one randomly selected round of Phase 1 (rounds 1-5), and in one randomly selected round
of Phase 2 (rounds 6-10).
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—————– new set of instructions ——————
Instructions for belief elicitation sessions19
Welcome to this study on economic decision-making. These instructions are a detailed de-
scription of the procedures we will follow. You earned e4.00 to show up on time. You can earn
additional money during the study depending on the choices you make.
During the study you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants. We also
ask you to switch off your mobile phone now. If you have a question at any time, please raise
your hand and remain seated: I will come to your desk to answer it.
As we proceed with the instructions, you will be asked to answer ten questions designed to
verify your understanding of the instructions. You will receive 20 cents for each question you
answer correctly at the first trial.
You will be paid privately and in cash at the end of the study.
In this experiment, you are asked to provide an estimate about decisions made by other peo-
ple who took part in a previous study. This study was conducted in Cologne, at this laboratory.
Below we report the instructions we used in this previous study. We ask you to read them
on your own.
It is important that you carefully follow these instructions and fully understand the original
instructions. To verify your full understanding, we ask you to answer the same quiz we admin-
istered to the participants who took part in the previous study. You will receive 20 cents for
19Instructions for belief elicitation for the Safe Exit treatment. Instructions for the Simultaneous Exit treat-
ment are available upon request from the authors.
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each question you answer correctly at the first trial.
When everyone has completed this quiz, we will proceed and explain your task in today’s
study, and how your earnings are computed.
—————– instructions for the original experiment here ——————
Your task.
You will be asked to guess the choices made by the participants in the first round of the
previous study.
At the beginning of todays study, the computer will randomly draw the choices made in the
first round by 20 of the subjects who took part in the previous study. Of these 20 participants,
10 were assigned the role of blue players, while the other 10 were assigned the role of red players.
None of them chose to exit.
You need to answer two questions:
1. How many of the 10 blue players chose RIGHT in the first round?
2. How many of the 10 red players chose UP in the first round if their counterpart selected
RIGHT?
For both questions, your answer should be an integer number between 0 and 10.
Your earnings.
Your earnings can vary between 0 and 13 euro per question. The closer you get to the
correct answer, the higher your earnings. Please see Table 1. You earn 13 euros if your guess
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coincides with the right answer, or if it departs from it by at most one unit (from above or
below). If instead your guess departs from the correct answer by 2 units, you earn 11; if it
departs from the correct answer by 3 units, you earn 8.5, and so forth and so on. If your guess
departs from the correct answer by 6 or more units you earn nothing.
Table 1: Earnings table
Distance from the correct answer Earnings
0 or 1 13
2 11
3 8.5
4 5
5 0.5
6 or more 0
You will be paid for one of the two guesses selected at random by the computer. You will
know which guess will be relevant for your payment only at the end of the experiment. It is
hence in your interest to pay attention to both decisions.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions and I will come to your desk to answer
them.
55
 
